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Drafi Recommendalinn
on WEU in the Atlantic Alliance
The Assembly,
O Recalling its Recommendation 579t to which the Council has still not replied;(iil Deeply concerned that none of the major aims set out in the 10th December 1991 declaration of
WEU member states for developing WEU as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance and improving the r6le, responsibilities and contributions of WEU member states in the alliance
has yet been achieved;
(iii) Alarmed that almost two years after the Atlantic Alliance's decision at the highest level to make its
collective assets available for WEU operations on the basis of the CJTF concept no progress can be seen
towards agreement on the ways and means of implementing this project;
(iv) Noticing on the contary the almost total political and military marginalisation of WEU in the
efforts to bring the conflict in former Yugoslavia to an end despite all WEU's efforts;
(v) Concerned by the continuing uncertainty with regard to internal political stability and democratic
development in the Russian Federation;
(vi) Preoccupied also by the instability in the Middle East and the risk that violent activities of extremist
forces in certain North African countries, particularly in Algeria, may spill over into Europe;
(vii) Considering that, while NATO has extended the range of its activities into the area of crisis-mana-
gement and peace-keeping, the alliance has not yet clearly defined its new rOle in the changed internatio-
nal security environment;
(viii) Awarc that, in the absence of a major security threat and at a time of increasing economic Euro-
American and Japanese-American competition, there is a risk of North American and European security
interests drifting apart;
(bc) Reiterating therefore WEU's responsibility for assessing the repercussion on future transatlantic
relations of establishing an enhanced European security and defence identity which is to be negotiated at
the 1996 intergovernmental conference;
(x) Noting that the study on NATO enlargement pospones a decision on the " who " and the " when "
of any NATO expansion and therefore offers no firm answer to the security concerns of those Cenfral and
Eastern European countries which still live in a security vacuum;
(xi) Convinced therefore that WEU should do more in order to offer its associate partner countries every
possible means ofjoining in WEU's activities and its relations with NATO;
(xii) Stressing however that any further WEU enlargement should not call in question the scope of
Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and still believing that all European NATO countries could be
entitled to full WEU membership;
(xiii) Convinced that NAIO's working and decision-making methods which have proved their worth in
that organisation since 1949 should be considered insofar as they may be of value for adaptation by WEU
in the new geostrategic framework of Europe,
Rpcotrlvmwos rHAr rrm CouNcl-
1. Make an urgent and high-level political approach to the Atlantic Alliance in order to overcome the dif-
ficulties in implementing the alliance's decision to make its collective assets available for WEU operations;
2. Include
(a) nits contribution to the 1996 intergovernmental conference,
(b) in its planned common European defence policy statemenE
t. S"" app"nOi*.
DOCUIYGNT 1487
(c) in its common reflection on the new European security conditions which might lead to a white
paper on European security,
a comprehensive WEU concept for developing the future transatlantic partnership in a global context;
3. 
- 
Care$lly assess tle irnplications for transatlantic relations of the implementation of the options
now being discussed in WEU regarding the future relations with the European Union;
4.- Make a comprehensive assessment of the complementary functions of WEU and NATO in the area
of collective defence taking into account the differen-ces in the texts of Article V of the modified Brussels
Trea$ and of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and of the problems which might arise from the fact that
both organisations continue to rely in collective defence on the same military itructures but on dffierent
legal grounds;
5. Determine criteria for task-sharing between WEU and NATO in contingencies such as crisis-mana-
g_emgnt and peace-keeping, taking into account the lessons learned through the conflict in former Yugo-
slavia and seek agreement with NATO on these criteria;
6. Give greater political substance to the joint meetings between the Permanent Councils of WEU and
NATO and organise these meetings at ministerial level on appropriate occasions in order to
(a) agree on joint assessments of the new security challenges in Ewope and the world and of the
appropriate responses ;
(b) agree on a specific working progftlrnme for sharing risks, rdles and responsibilities between the
two organisations, with particular regard to organising work betrveen the military staffs of
WEU and NATO;
7. Inform the Assembly of the nature of any difFrculties encountered by WEU member countries in
carrying out their intention of inroducing joint positions into the alliance's consultation process and on
possible ways of overcoming these difficulties, particularly in the light of the presenf provisions of
Article J.4 of the Maasricht Treatyi
q. Make an urgent assessment of the consequences of the study on NATO enlargement for WEU's
future policy vis-d-vis Central and Eastern countries and inform the Assembly of its conclusions;
9. Seek agreement with NATO in order to establish ways and means for associate partner countries to
participate in joint Council meetings between WEU and NAIO;
10. To this end, accelerate the conclusion of security agreements by WEU with NATO, associate mem-
bers, observers and associate partners;
11. Provide regular information on the results of the joint WEU/I{ATO Council meetings;
12. (a) Follow up paragraph 3 of Recommendation 579;
(b) lncrease the number of participating countries in the WEU group on transatlantic publicity acti-
vities from 13 to27, clarify its status and place it under the chairmanship of the WEU Secretary-
General;
(c) Give the Assembly a comprehensive report on the origin, activities and programme of work of
this group;
(d) Include in the group members of the Assembly appointed by the Presidential Committee.
DOCUMENI 1487
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Iord Finsberg, Rapporteur)
I.Introductian
1. Continued reflection on the question as to
how transatlantic relationships in security and
defence matters and, specifically, co-operation
between WEU and NATO might be developed
further appears necessary for several reasons.
Ttvo in particular might be stressed: the first
concerns the impact on both organisations of new
security conditions in a changed international
environment, while the second must be viewed in
the context of defining WEU's future r6le as the
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance in the fra-
mework of the 1996 intergovernmental confe-
rence. It should be recalled that in their Maastricht
declaration of 10th December 1991, WEU mem-
ber countries agreed to re-examine the present
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty on security
and defence in 1996. They further agreed that this
re-examination would " extend to relations bet-
ween WEU and the Atlantic Alliance ". In their
Lisbon declaration of 15th May 1995, the WEU
ministers tasked the Permanent Council to present
a report at their next meeting in Madrid. It is the-
refore most important for the Assembly to ensure
its views on this important matter are included in
the debate by the Council's experts before the
Council draws its final conclusions.
2. The development of future relations bet-
ween WEU and NATO depends on a number of
factors. While our ffeatrnent of them cannot claim
to be exhaustive, the following deserve particular
mention:
- 
the evolution of future security condi-
tions in Europe and in the world and their
implications;
- 
the political evolution of Russia and its
relationship with NATO, the European
Union andWestern European Union; and
- 
the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance
and its consequenpes for NAIO's func-
tion and structures;
- 
the way in which Western European
Union develops as the defence compo-
nent of the European Union and imple-
ments its intention of becoming fully
operational. The impact on transatlantic
relations of the outcome of the 1996
intergovernmental conference should be
seen in this context;
- 
the implementation of the alliance's
decision to make its collective assets
available to WEU and of the CJTF
concept;
- 
the future r6le of the North American
allies in the alliance, particularly that of
the United States of America;
- 
the development of relations between
NATO, the United Nations and the
OSCE in relation to NATO's new tasks
in peace-keeping and crisis-manage-
ment, taking account of the lessons to be
learned from the conflict in former
Yugoslavia.
3. A major problem, resolution of which also
depends on many of these factors, is the question
of NATO's eventual expansion and the means by
which it is achieved, which will have a major
impact on the enlargement of the European Union
and of Western European Union.
4. At a time when both European and Atlantic
authorities are still in the process of weighing the
consequences of radical changes in the security
environment following the collapse of the Soviet
empire and the rise of new kinds of risks, dangers
and threats to international and especially to Euro-
pean security, it is important for the Assembly of
WEU to make a useful contribution to helping the
Council develop a rational security concept and
one that is feasible and acceptable to the relevant
European and Atlantic authorities. This should be
the major objective of the report the Political
Committee will submit to the Assembly in
December.
II. The identifualian of new secarity rislu
and their possible consequences
5. The preliminary conclusions on the formu-
lation of a common European defence policy
published by the WEU Council of Ministers on
14th November 1994 ', underlined that the formu-
lation of such a policy requires a detailed analysis
of risks to European security. To that end the ana-
lysis elaborated in the framework of the CFSP
bodies on broader security matters " should be
complemented by a military analysis, to be prepa-
red by WEU taking account of risk analyses car-
l. Document 1443,l8th November 1994.
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ried out within NATO. ...WEU should examine
developments in the transatlantic partnership which
represent an important conrmon interest with the
aim of introducing joint positions agreed in WEU
into the process of consultation in the alliance. "
6. Furthermore, WEU ministers stressed that
their aim is " that the present policy document
will evolve into a comprehensive common Euro-
pean defence policy statement in the perspective
of the intergovernmental conference of 1996 " .
This intention was reaffirmed 
- 
though in a far
less determined manner 
- 
in the Lisbon declara-
tion of 15th May 1995'; but since then no specific
follow-up action has been taken. Perhaps in the
meantime the common reflection on new Euro-
pean security conditions initiated by the WEU
Council according to paragraph 6 of the Noord-
wijk declaration with a view to publishing even-
tually a white paper on European security has
somehow eclipsed the work on the formulation of
a co[rmon defence policy statement.
7. Nevertheless, one should not forget that
both projects are different and that the formula-
tion of a white paper might be a precondition to
contemplating a common defence policy. The
common reflection on the new European security
conditions agreed by WEU in Lisbon includes
considerations regarding common values, inter-
ests and risks which should form the basis for
establishing a joint policy approach between
WEU and NAIO, as well as the division of work
between both organisations. According to this
document, Europeans and Americans have both
an interest in maintaining democratic values,
human rights, international peace and order and
the rule of law.
8. If it is recognised that Europe has world-
wide economic interests, is it possible to affirm
that all Europeans share the same or similar inter-
ests or is it necessary to identify a differentiation
of interests between European countries? Who
should consequently be responsible for defending
these interests, and who should be responsible for
protecting the security of European citizens in the
world? What about the world-wide economic
interests of the United States and Canada and the
protection of their citizens in the world? Are
Europeans responsible for defending North Ame-
rican interests, and North Americans for defend-
ing Europe's interests in the world? According to
recent press-reports3, a kind of new ffansatlantic
bargain in this sense is under study.
9. Regarding the new security risks, the cha-
racter and causes of potential armed conflict have
to be studied as well as if and to what extent Euro-
peans and Americans are both challenged by such
new conflicts. The lessons of the conflict in for-
mer Yugoslavia have to be drawn. The risks ari-
sing from the proliferation of weapons of mass
desffuction and their means of delivery of inter-
national terrorism, organised crime, drug traffic-
king and uncontrolled and illegal immigration,
and, finally, large-scale environmental damage
have to be analysed as well as the appropriate
means of countering them.
10. Russia's foreign and security policy and the
dangers of its internal political instability in the
light of the size of its conventional forces and
extensive nuclear arsenal and also the future deve-
lopment of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) are of major interest for WEU and the
Atlantic Alliance. But how should these two orga-
nisations co-ordinate their responses to these chal-
lenges? Similar questions arise regarding the secu-
rity of the Mediterranean basin and the Middle
East and in other regions of the world. One should
first examine in which way both the Atlantic
Alliance and WEU have so far reacted and adapted
themselves to the new security challenges.
III. The evolation of the North Atlantic Alliance
since the end of the cold. war
11. The London declaration on a transformed
North Atlantic Alliance, issued by the heads of
state and of government participating in the mee-
ting of the North Atlantic Council in London on
5th and 6th July 1990, stressed that, inter alia:
" our alliance must be even more an agent
ofchange. It can help build the structures of
a more united continent, supporting securi-
ty and stability with the sffength of our sha-
red faith in democracy, the rights of the
individual, and the peaceful resolution of
disputes. We reaffirm that security and sta-
bility do not lie solely in the military
dimension, and we intend to enhance the
political component of our alliance as pro-
vided for by Article 2 of our treary.o
4. NATO must become an institution where
Europeans, Canadians and Americans work
together not only for the common defence,
but to build new partnerships with all the
nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community
must reach out to the countries of the East
which were adversaries in the cold war, and
extend to them the hand of friendship.
4. Article 2 of the Washington Treaty states: " The parties
will contribute toward the further development of peaceful
and friendly international relations by strengthening their
free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of
the principles upon which these institutions are founded and
by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They
will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic
policies and will encourage economic collaboration between
any or all of them. "
2. Document 1455, 15th May 1995.
3. Frankfu rter Allgemei ne Zeitung, 5th October I 995.
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5. We will remain a defensive alliance and
will continue to defend all the territory of
all our members. We have no aggressive
intentions and we commit ourselves to the
peaceful resolution of all disputes.
20. NATO will prepare a new allied mili-
tary sfrategy moving away from " forward
defence " where appropriate, towards a
reduced forward presence and modifying
" flexible response " to reflect a reduced
reliance on nuclear weapons.
23. Today, our alliance begins a major
transformation working with all the coun-
tries of Europe; we are determined to create
enduring peace on this continent. "
12. The next important step was taken, when
the NATO summit meeting held in Rome, on 7th
and 8th November l99l,gave the Atlantic Allian-
ce a new direction by:
- 
publishing a new strategic concept based
on an integrated military strucnre and an
approximate mix of conventional and
nuclear forces. These were to be adjusted
to their new tasks, becoming smaller and
more flexible. For the flrst time mention
was made of NATO's conventional
forces becoming more mobile o'to
enable them to react to a wide range of
contingencies " and, again for the first
time, it was announced that these forces
would be reorganised both for defence
and to respond in crisis-management
situations. At the same time, the referen-
ce to the importance of consultations in
the alliance under Article 4 of the
Washington Treaty indicated the allian-
ce's intention to extend the range of
consultations to risks and threats beyond
the geographic area ofcollective defence
determined in Article 6 of the treaty;
- 
introducing the concept of " interlocking
institutions tying together the countries
of Europe and North America "o thus
describing a new European security
architecture 'o in which NATO, the
CSCE, the European Communiry WEU
and the Council of Europe complement
each other ";
- 
basing the alliance's security policy on
three reinforcing elements: dialogue, co-
operation and the maintenance of a col-
lective defence capability;
- 
recognising for the frst time the reinfor-
cing effect on the integrity and effective-
ness of the alliance of developing a
European security and defence identity,
and welcoming " the perspective of a
reinforcement of the rdle of WEU, both
as the defence component of the process
of European unification and as a means
of strengthening the European pillar of
the alliance, bearing in mind the different
nature of its relations with the alliance
and with the European Political Union ";
- 
creating the North Atlantic Co-operation
Council (NACC), thus allowing most of
the member countries of the former War-
saw Pact to hold regular meetings with
the North Atlantic Council at ministerial
and ambassadorial level.
13. The NATO summit in Brussels on 10th and
llth January 1994 was the third and last to date in
the series of summit meetings paving the way for
important changes in the alliance's direction and
purpose. This summit meeting and the decision
taken have to be seen in the context of the chan-
ged situation arising out of:
- 
the break-up of the Soviet Union and its
replacement by the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), in which the
Russian Federation plays a dominant
r6le;
- 
the aggravation of the armed conflict in
former Yugoslavia;
- 
the entry into force of the Maastricht
Treaty with its provisions on a common
foreign and security policy for Europe;
- 
the changed political landscape in the
United States following the election of
Democrat President Bill Clinton now
facing a hostile Congress.
14. The January 1994 summit meeting gave the
new American President the opportuniry to pre-
sent himself as an initiator of a renewed policy for
the Atlantic Alliance: he thus endorsed the initia-
tion of the partnership for peace programme
(PFP), the initiative to open the way for the allian-
ce's expansion, the reaffirmation of the alliance's
support for a European security and defence iden-
tity and the agreement to make the collective
assets of the alliance available for WEU opera-
tions undertaken by the European allies in pursuit
of their common foreign and security policy. The
concept of combined joint task forces (CJIF) pro-
viding " separable but not separate " military
capabilities that " could be employed by NATO or
WEU was intended as a major means of imple-
menting this decision.
15. Some 20 months later, the question of
NATO's enlargement remains unresolved. Nor is
there agreement on the implementation of the
CJTF concept. NATO is the sole partner on which
the United Nations relies in trying to bring an end
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to the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Hence,
although NATO is in practice developing its
newly-chosen mission in the area of peace-keep-
ing, peace-enforcement and crisis-management
under the authority of the United Nations, its
internal debate seems to be overwhelmingly
dominated by the problem of enlargement and its
relations with Russia. Despite the development of
detailed programmes and activities in the frame-
work of PFP, the final purpose of this initiative
remains unclear.
16. Furthermore, on the fundamental question
of the direction in which the alliance and its orga-
nisation should develop in future, no concrete
indication is visible. Yet most of the outstanding
problems depend on the future r6le of the alliance.
In September 1994, a " NAIO long-term study "
was therefore initiated, but it is an open question
as to when discussions in the framework of this
study will lead to concrete decisions. So far there
have been no indications other than that NATO
should assume a more political and less military
r6le. But there are hints that the consequences of
the substantial reductions in the defence budgets
of most member countries will be an important
consideration in the study.
17. More progress is visible in relation to the
criteria NATO will apply to its eventual expan-
sion. A study for defining the requirements for
NATO enlargement was published on 28th Sep-
tember 1995 and presented by NATO partner
countries in the NACC and PFP. The alliance had
already previously made clear that if there is any
enlargement, all the potential new members will
be full members, thus ruling out any form of asso-
ciate status or intermediate forms of membership
or partnership. Secondly, it has been decided that
enlargement will be decided on a case-by-case
basis and " that some nations may attain member-
ship before others. '05
18. The arrangements for parallelism between
NATO's enlargement and the enlargement of the
European Union and Western European Union
have not yet been worked out. But the abovemen-
tioned study on NATO enlargement underlines
that the enlargement of NAIO is a parallel process
and will complement that of the European Union.
The study then says that:
" The enlargement of the two organisations
will proceed autonomously according to
their respective internal dynamics and pro-
cesses. This means they are unlikely to pro-
ceed at precisely the same pace. But the
alliance views its own enlargement and that
of European Union as mutually supportive
and parallel processes which together will
make a significant contribution to sffeng-
thening Europe's security structure. Thus
each organisation should ensure that their
respective processes are in fact mutually
supportive of the goal of enhancing Euro-
pean stabitity and security. While no rigid
parallelism is foreseen, each organisation
will need to consider developments in the
other.'o
19. Regarding the relationship between the
enlargement of WEU and NATO, the study
emphasises:
" Because of the cumulative effect of the
security safeguards of Article V of the
modified Brussels Treaty and of Article 5
of the Washington Treaty, the maintenance
of this linkage is essential. Both enlarge-
ment processes should, therefore, be com-
patible and mutually supportive. At the
same time, WEU is being developed as the
defence component of the European Union,
which sfrengthens the relationship between
the two organisations. An eventual broad
congruence of European membership in
NATO, EU and WEU would have positive
effects on European securiry. The alliance
should at an appropriate time give particu-
lar consideration to countries with a pers-
pective of EU membership, and which have
shown an interest in joining NATO, in
order to consider the basis indicated in this
study, how they can contribute to transat-
lantic security within the Washington Trea-
ty and to determine whether to invite them
to join NAIO. "
20. [t is not known as yet whether the NATO
long-term study will discuss institutional and
structural questions with a view eventually to
reconsidering the internal decision-making pro-
cess in the alliance. If the enlargement of the
alliance becomes a reality, decision-making might
in fact become more difficult, bearing in mind that
NATO is a purely intergovernmental organisation
in which all decisions must be taken by consensus.
21. The study on NAIO enlargement empha-
sises that in the process of enlargement the alli-
ance rests upon commonality of views and a
commitment to work for consensus; part of the
evaluation of the qualifications of a possible new
member will be its demonsftated commitrnent to
that process and those values. " We will invite
prospective new members to confirm that they
understand and accept this and act in good faith
accordingly. The alliance may require, if appro-
priate, specific political commitments in the cour-
se of accession negotiations ". Furthermore, in
Chapter V of the study, new member states will be
expected to " commit themselves to good faith
efforts to build consensus within the alliance on
all issues, since consensus is the basis of alliance
cohesion and decision-making. "
5. See paragraph 7 of the communiqu6 issued by the North
Atlantic Council on lst December 1994.
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22. It should be noted, both in the context of an
examination of WEU's r6le in the Atlantic Allian-
ce and in relation to discussions taking place in the
framework of the 1996 intergovernmental confe-
rence on how to facilitate the European decision-
making process in security and defence matters,
that NAIO's decision-making methods, establi-
shed since the creation of that organisation n 1949,
have so far not been called into question, at least in
public debate. NATO has not experienced the pro-
blems of a rotating presidency, nor of an arrange-
ment such as the o'Tro'rka ". The North Atlantic
Council is chaired by NAIO's Secretary-General
whose responsibility it is to achieve consensus
among the 16 member countries. This long-stan-
ding practice seems so far to have proved its worth.
23. One should not, of course, in this context,
overlook the important leadership r6le of the
United States of America within the Atlantic
Alliance and its organisational structures. Ameri-
can leadership and the threat to common security
during the cold war have doubtless facilitated
cohesion within the alliance. Even the special r6le
played by France never seriously called this basic
cohesion into question.
24. When the Atlantic Alliance agreed, in the
aftermath of East-West confrontation, to extend
its activities to peace-keeping and peace-enforce-
ment under United Nations mandate, the conflict
in former Yugoslavia revealed the enormous diffi-
culties the alliance had to reach agreement on
implementing its decision in this specific case.
However, ultimately, the alliance alone was able
to reach a decision on concrete military action for
ending the siege of Sarajevo, and to implement it.
The bombing of Serbian targets finally brought
them to the negotiating table as many of us had
advocated for years.
25. On the other hand, when fifteen defence
ministers of countries of the European Union and
of the Atlantic Alliance participating in the peace-
keeping effort in former Yugoslavia decided, in
early June 1995, to send a Dutch, French, and
United Kingdom rapid reaction force to Bosnia,
the status of this force remained ambiguous. In
any event, placing this unit under the authority of
Western European Union was never envisaged
despite the fact that its tasks exactly meet the cri-
teria for " Petersberg-type " missions, according
to which military units of WEU member states,
acting under the authority of WEU, might be
employed for:
- 
humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- 
peace-keeping tasks;
- 
tasks of combat forces in crisis-manage-
ment, including peace-m&rgt
The marginalisation of WEU in efforts to re-esta-
blish the conditions for peace in former Yugo-
slavia is a reality likely to increase the number of
those expressing serious doubt about the useful-
ness of WEU and its ability to make a meaningful
contribution to European security that might lead
NATO to accelerate the implementation of the
alliance's decision of January 1994 to make its
collective assets available for WEU operations
undertaken by the European allies.
IV. Ths WEU Coancil's concept of
WEU's relations with thB Atlantic Alliarue
- 
andiEimplcmentation
26. Without entering into a lengthy description
of the historical genesis of both the Atlantic
Alliance and Western European Union and the
surrounding political landscape determining the
character and evolution of relations between
them, it is useful nevertheless to recall the princi-
pal ways in which the modified Brussels Treaty
and the Washington Treaty resemble one another
and those in which they differ. Both treaties fol-
low a like path in creating defence alliances
upholding the right of individual or collective
self-defence as recognised under Article 5l of the
Charter of the United Nations.
27. As your Rapporteur explained in his first
report on WEU in the Atlantic Alliance which he
submitted to the Assembly five years ago 6, the
signatories of the Washington Treaty included all
the members of the then Western Union. As soon as
a military system was established under NAIO, in
1950, Western Union transferred to it the exercise
of its responsibilities as a military organisation.
From then on, the activities of WEU's precursor
have been inextricably linked with those of NATO.
28. When the original 1948 Brussels Treaty
was modified in 1954 and extended to the Federal
Republic of Germany and Italy, a new Article IV
was inserted into the treaty which defined the
basic principles of co-operation between the two
organisations, as follows:
o'In the execution of the treaty, the high
contracting parties and any organs establi-
shed by them under the treaty shall work in
close co-operation with the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation.
Recognising the undesirability of duplica-
ting the military staffs of NATO, the Coun-
cil and its Agency will rely on the appro-
priate military authorities of NATO for
information and advice on military
mgans. oo
29. The importance of this contractual link
was, in the past, largely concentrated in the secu-
rity guarantees in the event of armed attack
6. Document 1225, l2th May 1990.
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against member countries, based on Article V of
the modified Brussels Treaty and Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty. Even noq at a time when the
risk of armed attack in Europe (or on America)
has been dramatically reduced, the principle of
co-operation laid down in Article IV of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty remains an essential element
of European security.
30. However, co-operation between NATO and
WEU is now becoming increasingly important in
areas where the two treaties follow different
objectives and directions. One such area is peace-
keeping and crisis-management. Article VItr. 3 of
the modified Brussels Treaty obliges WEU mem-
ber countries at the request of any of them " to
consult with regard to any situation which may
constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this
threat should arise, ofa danger to economic stabi-
lity ". While this provision has been regarded as
the legal basis for WEU joint actions in the Gulf
war and for the decisions taken by the WEU
Council at its meeting in Petersberg on June 1992
on the use of military units answerable to WEU
for peace-keeping, crisis-management and peace-
making tasks in accordance with the provisions of
the United Nations Charter, the Washington Trea-
ty does not provide NATO with a similar legal
basis. Nevertheless, in 1991, the Atlantic Alliance
also agreed to extend its activities to peace-keep-
ing and crisis-management, thus giving an enlar-
ged interpretation to Article 4 of the Washington
Treaty according to which " the parties will
consult together, whenever, in the opinion of any
of them, the territorial integrity, political indepen-
dence or security of any of the parties is threate-
ned ". Since then, NATO has claimed that the ear-
lier slogan " out of area is out ofbusiness " is out
of date.
31. The fact that both WEU and NATO consi-
der they have responsibilities in peace operations
and crisis-management, has meant that the divi-
sion of tasks between them has become a practical
problem which has yet to be resolved. Your Rap-
porteur will develop this question in greater detail
in the following paragraphs.
32. Another area in which Article IV has acqui-
red a new dimension is WEU's function as the
defence component of the European Union or, in
the words of the Maastricht Treaty, as an integral
part of the development of the Union. lndeed, the
preamble of the modified Brussels Treaty com-
mits the signatories " to promoting the unity and
encouraging the progressive integration of Euro-
pe ". Article Vm. 1 of the treaty stipulates that a
WEU Council shall be created for this very pur-
pose. Since the enrry into force of the Maastricht
Treaty, Western European Union's ties with
NATO and their evolution, also serve the interests
of the European Union. In the absence of any for-
mal relationship between the European Union and
the Atlantic Alliance, WEU is the sole connecting
link between these organisations. Logically the-
refore, when WEU decided to proceed with its
own re-examination of the present provisions of
the Maastricht Treaty, with a view to the 1996
intergovernmental cbnference, it stressed that
'o this re-examination will take account of the pro-
gress and experience acquired and... will extend
to relations between WEU and the Atlantic
Alliance ".
33. It is appropriate, therefore, for us now to
examine WEU's concept of its relations with
NATO and the degree to which it has been imple-
mented. Paragraph 4 of the declaration on Wes-
tern European Union, adopted by the member
countries of WEU on 10th December 1991 and
annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, describes
WEU's concept of its relations with the Atlantic
Alliance as follows:
" The objective is to develop WEU as a
means to strengthen the European pillar of
the Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly WEU is
prepared to develop further the close wor-
king links between WEU and the alliance
and to strengthen the r6le, responsibilities
and contributions of WEU member states
in the alliance. This will be undertaken on
the basis of the necessary transparency and
complementarity between the emerging
European security and defence identity and
the alliance. WEU will act in conformity
with the positions adopted in the Atlantic
Alliance.
- 
WEU member states will intensify their
co-ordination on alliance issues which
represent an important common interest
with the aim of introducing joint posi-
tions agreed in WEU into the process of
consultation in the alliance which will
remain the essential forum for consulta-
tion among its members and the venue
for agreement on policies bearing on the
security and defence commitments of
allies under the North Atlantic Treaty.
- 
Where necessary, dates and venues of
meetings will be synchronised and wor-
king methods harmonised.
- 
Close co-operation will be established
between the Secretariats-General of
WEU and NATO. "
34. Regarding the development of WEU's ope-
rational r6le, the above declaration refers, inter
alia, to the intention of strengthening this r6le by
closer, complementary military co-operation in
the alliance, in particular in the fields of logistics,
transport, training and strategic surveillance. In
implementing these various intentions account
has also be taken of Part II of the WEU declara-
tion of 10th December 1991 in which " other
9
DOCLJIvENT 1487
European member states of NATO " (which are
not members of the European Union) " are invited
to become associate members of WEU in a way
which will give them the possibility of participa-
ting fully in the activities of WEU ".
35. Turkey, Norway and Iceland thus became
associate members of WEU on 6th March 1995
(the date of the entry into force of Greece's acces-
sion to the modified Brussels Treaty). While these
three countries now have the possibility of partici-
pating to a large extent in the activities of the
Council and its subsidiary bodies, and also those
of the Assembly, there is no disguising the fact
that this is not " full" participation in WEU, as
associate members have not been invited to acce-
de to the modified Brussels Treaty as the Assem-
bly has recommended on several occasions. The
question of WEU's future relationship with its
associate members will remain on the agenda,
particularly with regard to Ttrrkey, whose political
and strategic importance for European and Atlan-
tic security have been of imrnense value in the
past and will continue to increase in the present
and future international security scene.
36. The most efficient way to develop WEU as
a means of strengthening the European pillar of
the Atlantic Alliance remains the accession of all
its European member countries to the modified
Brussels Treaty. Such a step would not only sim-
plify the at present very complicated working
methods of the WEU Council (and those of the
Assembly), but also put these countries in a better
position to participate in the debate on WEU's
future relations with the European Union. This is
particularly desirable in the case of Turkey, which
might be led to call into question the entire range
of policies it has followed to date 
- 
even its mem-
bership of the Atlantic Alliance 
- 
if it were to
conclude that it might be excluded defrnitively or
for an indefinite period from full accession to
WEU and the European Union.
37. Regarding the intention of developing fur-
ther close working links between WEU and the
alliance it should first be welcomed that the num-
ber of joint Council meetings has increased
steadily since the first joint meeting held in 1992.
It would appear that at least four annual joint mee-
tings are planned for 1995 and the years that
follow. The last joint meeting of the Permanent
Councils was held on 28th September 1995. It
appears that WEU is represented at these joint
meetings by eighteen ambassadors, including
those of associate member and observer countries
but representatives of the associate partner coun-
tries do not participate. However, the impression
is that such meetings are rather of symbolic
importance than practical use. Even if the Assem-
bly is not aware of the agenda of these meetings,
it seems that no breakthrough on outstanding
questions has been achieved through them.
38. It is therefore necessary to re-examine what
aims these meetings s!o.ul{ pursu€. If the main
purpose is reciprocal information, it would
depend on the specific subject of the agenda whe-
ther or not the associate partner of WEU should
be allowed to participate. Since these countries
have a chance of becoming sooner or later full
members of the European Union and Western
European Union, WEU should seek an agreement
with NATO which would allow them to particip-
ate in at least some joint WEUA{AIO Council
meetings.
39. After only one of the joint sessions of the
North Atlantic Council and the Council of WEU,
that held in Brussels on 8th June 1993, was a press
release issued. This contained information on the
combined NATOAilEU concept of naval opera-
tions in the Adriatic. It would be highly desirable
if publication of press releases at the close of futu-
re joint WEU/I',[ATO Council meetings were to
become a more regular practice.
40. In the very important area of implementing
the decision of the 1994 NATO summit meeting
to make the collective assets of the alliance avai-
lable for WEU operations on the basis of the com-
bined joint task forces concept (CJTF), there
seernso as yet, to be no sign of progress. WEU is
still awaiting an answer to the proposal it trans-
mitted to NATO at the end of June 1994. Further-
more, in May 1995, WEU sent NAIO a paper on
the " Mechanisms and procedures for WEU use of
alliance assets and capabilities " required for its
own operations. According to a report submitted
by the British House of Commons Defence Com-
mittee on 19th July 1995',
" The main problems have arisen over
questions of ultimate military and political
confrol ofthe forces concerned. Ifbased on
NATO staff, they would be commanded...
ultimately by SACEUR, an American 5-star
general. France is reported as having been
unhappy that there should be a remaining
United States element in the command
chain in cases where the United States was
not an active participant, and where an ope-
ration was purportedly conducted by WEU.
On the political level, the respective rOles
of the North American Council and what-
ever crisis-management organisation WEU
could muster remain uncertain. Understan-
dable questions have also been raised over
the question of payment for the use of
NATO collective assets, particularly when
they are to be used by nations who have not
made any contribution towards them; and
the use of United States national assets,
such as airlift, in an operation in which the
United States does not wish to participate. "
7. The future of NATO: The 1994 summit and its conse-
quences, House of Commons, Session 199+95, tenth report.
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It is also not known to what extent the alliance has
implemented its commitment to adapt its political
and military structures in line with the decisions
of the summit meetings.
41,. Equally, the objective of the WEU member
countries, as stated in their declaration of
lOth December l99l of endeavouring to infrodu-
ce joint positions agreed in WEU into the process
of consultation in the alliance is, according to
information obtained by your Rapporteur during
talks with Council members, running into serious
difficulties and indeed seems virtually impossible
to achieve.
42. The reasons for these difficulties appear to
be twofold: frst, it appears that all WEU member
countries prefer to remain free to express their
national positions in the framework of the North
Atlantic Council. Second, there is some reluc-
tance in the Atlantic Alliance to accept that a
group of countries present in the North Atlantic
Council should adopt positions fixed previously
as a kind of " fait accompli oo on matters on which
the alliance wishes first to consult and then to
reach a decision.
43. If the reasons for wishing to preserve the
right of free expression are very understandable,
the problem acquires a further dimension in the
context of the present efforts initiated in both the
European Union and Western European Union to
pave the way for a true common security and
defence policy. The elaboration of such a Euro-
pean common policy and the establishment of
possible new institutional rules in this area would
be illusory if all European member countries
retained their right to speak with different voices
in the framework of the North Atlantic Council.
This example shows, in any event, that for the
time being any attempt to introduce majority
voting procedures in defence maffers is unrealis-
tic. It is legitimate to ask whether WEU member
countries have committed themselves to the
objective of introducing joint positions into the
alliance without really evaluating the conse-
quences and the possibilities of achieving that
arm.
44. Some progress seems to have been achie-
ved in relation to the planned synchronisation of
dates and venues of meetings and harmonisation
of working methods. There is now an established
practice according to which meetings of the Per-
manent Councils of both organisations are held on
different days and WEU Ministerial Councils
before those of the alliance. It seems, in particular,
that the United States and Canadian representa-
tives in the North Atlantic Permanent Council
appreciate the now established practice according
to which the WEU Chairmanship-in-Office briefs
the North Atlantic Permanent Council weekly on
current activities of Western European Union.
45. According the Council's information, prac-
tical co-operation between the Secretariats-Gene-
ral of WEU and NATO is working reasonably
well but is far from perfect and much more should
be done. The necessary security arrangements
between both organisations have still not been
finalised and rumour has it that NAIO shows
some reluctance in transmitting documents to
WEU. It is particularly regrettable that, according
to the second part of the fortieth annual report of
the Council8 secure communication links of the
WEU Planning Cell with the headquarters of
NATO still do not exist.
46. However, the most important issue is, of
course, to what extent WEU and NATO are
agreed on the distribution of tasks and responsibi-
lities betrveen them. There is flrst the responsibili-
ty for defence against armed attack to which both
WEU and NATO are committed under Article V
of the modified Brussels Treaty and Article 5 of
the Washington Treaty. It seems that there is
agreement that collective defence is a task for
both organisations, in as much that WEU member
countries will continue to act in the framework of
Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, in
other words to rely on NATO military structures.
But serious questions will need to be raised if the
present discussions on possible integration of
WEU and the European Union might jeopardise
the scope of the collective defence obligation laid
down in Article V of the modified Brussels Trea-
ty, binding to a far greater extent than that under
the Washington Treaty.
47. When the ministers for foreign affairs of
the European Union met informally in Santander
on 11th September 1995, a number of principles
were published, according to which institutional
questions regarding the development of a Euro-
pean security identity were to be dealt with. One
of these principles suggested that the develop-
ment of a European security identity would
contain a collective defence commitrnent analo-
gous to that laid down in the modified Brussels
Treaty, but that this solidarity might continue to
be expressed in the framework of NATO. This
wording is somewhat ambiguous, since it may
mean that NATO might finally become the only
organisation responsible for collective defence.
48. It should be borne in mind that at least five
member countries of the European Union, at pre-
sent observers in WEU, namely Austria, Den-
mark, Finland,Ireland and Sweden, have difficul-
ty in accepting collective defence obligations in
the framework of the modified Brussels Treaty.
The risk for European security would be very
great indeed if the closely-binding commitment
on collective defence that characterises WEU
membership were to be watered down in a newly-
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created European security structure in order to
make it palatable to countries that have so far
been reluctant to accept it. The principle of the
lowest coflrmon denominator applied to defence
is quite unacceptable.
49. However, there is a certain tendency in the
NATO bureaucracy to support ideas defended in
the European Union according to which direct
links could be established between the European
Union and NATO without needing Western Euro-
pean Union as a link. This would theoretically be
possible if a new treaty on European Union were
to contain a collective defence commitment simi-
lar to Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. In
view of the resistance of a number of member
countries to the full integration of the defence
dimension into the European Union in which
intergovernmental consensus is considered only
as an intermediary step on the way to a true inte-
grated common defence policy, such an approach
would be thinkable only if NATO were to be the
sole organisation responsible for the defence of
Europe on the single basis of Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty. But if, as Mrs. Aguiar under-
lined in her report of 16th May 1995 e, NATO
mititary structures are to be the only guarantee of
the allies' collective commitment, any withdrawal
of American forces, if confirmed, would put an
end to that structure.
50. If, conversely, the incorporation ofacollec-
tive defence commitment into a new treaty on
European Union (or in a protocol annexed to it)
meant the establishment of proper collective
defence responsibilities for the Union, it would be
illusory to believe that this would not substantial-
ly affect relations with NATO. On the contrary, it
would not only require fundamental changes in
NATO's sffuctures but also a political revision of
the whole range of Euro-Atlantic relations in
negotiations with the United States and Canada,
the result of which would be unpredictable.
51. WEU must still prove that it is the appro-
priate organisation for strengthening the Euro-
pean pillar of the Atlantic Alliance including the
collective defence area without calling into ques-
tion the core function of the Atlantic Alliance for
guaranteeing European security. A very thorough
examination of the complementary functions of
Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and
Article 5 of the WashinSon Treaty should be an
imponant part of the WEU Council's contribution
to preparing the 1996 intergovernmental confe-
rence. The importance of such a study is not lin-
ked to a specific risk of an armed attack on one of
the allies which has now been drastically reduced,
but to be considered in particular in the context of
enlargement.
52. With regard to the consultations between
NATO and WEU in future contingencies envisa-
ged by the NAIO summit of January 1994, the
main issue is the division of labour between both
organisations in peace-keeping and crisis-mana-
gement missions. Although there appears to be a
trend towards assigning an operation either to
NATO or WEU depending on whether the North
American allies participate or not, no formal crite-
ria have been developed. The abovementioned
view was not applied in the conflict in former
Yugoslavia, and it is highly likely that the distri-
bution of tasks will in future be decided on a case
by case basis. An agreement on the CJTF concept
will be crucial in this context; otherwise there is a
risk of WEU remaining incapable of carrying out
Petersberg missions unless it were eventually
decided these should be carried out entirely
without the use of NATO assets, which would be
highly undesirable.
53. In this respect it will not be sufficient to
decide on the division of labour between WEU
and NATO purely on a case-by-case basis, but it is
certainly not easy to establish practical criteria for
the task-sharing. In the Balkan conflict, NATO's
military capabilities were finally chosen to put an
end to the hostilities once the United States deci-
ded to put its full political weight into seeking a
diplomatic settlement of the conflict. Consequent-
ly, it was decided that post-war peace monitoring
would also be organised under NAIO's command
and responsibility despite strong Russian opposi-
tion. The final success of NAIO in settling the
Balkan crisis might reduce to silence the voices
which had been raised to express doubt about the
expediency of the Atlantic Alliance's decision to
seek new responsibilities in crisis-management
and peace-keeping and to call for NAIO to return
to its basic tasks of collective defence'0.
54. If NATO is to be established as a principal
actor in peace-keeping, irespective of the partici-
pation of American ground forces, the whole
CJTF concept might be jeopardised. However in
the context of the settlement of the Balkan
conflict, one should not underestimate the impor-
tance of the deployment of the Dutch, French and
United Kingdom rapid reaction force in Bosnia,
even if this force was not placed under the autho-
rity of WEU. Nevertheless, the WEU Council and
the respective member governments will still
have much to do in order to convince their
partners in NATO of the usefulness of giving cre-
dence to the alliance's readiness to make it's
collective assets available for WEU operations,
otherwise, the Petersberg declaration on WEU's
peace-keeping mission might remain a dead
letter.
10. See, for instance, Frederick Bonnart in the International
Herald Tribune, 30th June 1995.9. Document 1458, paragraph 61.
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55. There are a number of political and techni-
cal areas affecting international security in which
NATO and WEU should co-ordinate and harmo-
nise their activities. However, it is difficult to
obtain concrete information on the kind of criteria
both organisations employ for this apart from the
claim, repeated from time to time, that their rela-
tions are characterised by principles of transpa-
rency and complementarity. In the operational
area, the WEU Ministers have declared that
WEU's rOle will be sfrengthened in particular by:
- 
closer military co-operation, comple-
mentary to the alliance, in particular in
the fields of logistics, transport, training
and strategic surveillance;
- 
military units answerable to WEU.
56. [n the interests of transatlantic solidarity
and cohesion it seems particularly desirable that
WEU should keep its NAIO allies fully informed
of activities where it wishes to develop capabili-
ties independent of the alliance. For instance the
somewhat chilly reaction, contained in the com-
muniqu6 of the North Atlantic Council meeting
held in Noordwijk on 30th May 1995, should be
noted to the announcement by the WEU ministe-
rial meeting in Lisbon on 15th May 1995 on the
initiative taken by France, Italy and Spain in orga-
nising a land force (EUROFOR) and a maritime
force (EUROMARFOR). The NATO communi-
qu6 " took note that these forces would be open to
WEU member states, that they would be declared
' forces answerable to WEU ', and employed as a
priority in this framework and could likewise be
employed in the framework of NATO ".
57. The NATO communiqu6 then continues:
" We look forward with interest to a high-level
briefing on this initiative and to the expeditious
definition of the relationship of these forces with
WEU and NATO ". During his contacts with
representatives of WEU and NATO in the prepa-
ration of this report, your Rapporteur received
different messages regarding the status of these
forces and their relationship with WEU and
NATO. While WEU sources assured him that
,urangements were in progress for placing both
EUROFOR and EUROFORMAR in the same fra-
mework as the European Corps and that these
arrangements would be finalised in late Septem-
ber or early October, NAIO representatives com-
plained that they still had no substantive informa-
tion on the status of the newly-created
multinational units. It was noted particularly in
NATO that EUROFOR and EUROFORMAR
were to serve o' as a priority " in the framework of
WEU whereas the arrangements governing the
European Corps gave WEU no such priority.
58. In political terms, it is difficult to discern
whether, and to what extent, WEU and NATO co-
ordinate their assessments and activities. The
NATO communiqu6 on 30th May 1995 stresses,
inter alia, that " the alliance and the European
Union share common strategic interests ". For
their part, in November 1994, WEU countries rea-
ched preliminary conclusions on the formulation
of a common European defence policy in which
they reaffirmed that " NATO will remain the
essential forum for consultation among its mem-
bers and the venue for agreement on policies bea-
ring on the security and defence commitments of
the allies under the North Atlantic Treaty ".
59. However, there are several questions to be
examined. Is there reciprocal information on the
thinking in both organisations on their future tasks
and functions and their assessment of future risks
for European and Atlantic security and the impli-
cations thereof? A long-term study is in prepara-
tion in NAIO, while WEU is working on a o' com-
mon reflection on the new European security
conditions" that may lead to a " white paper " on
European security. The results of both studies
could give rise to consequences that might affect
the character and future rdles and functions of
WEU and NATO. Moreover, such consequences
will have a major impact on the future external
relations of the two organisations, for instance
with Russia or with countries in the Mediterra-
nean region, and also on the question ofexpansion.
60. The question ofexpansion is in fact at pre-
sent being dealt with by the Atlantic Alliance as a
matter of priority 
- 
apparently under new impetus
from the United States which has modified its
hitherto reluctant attitude 
- 
notwithstanding the
absence of clarification of the nature of the allian-
ce's future r6le and the future direction of transat-
lantic relations.
61. ln the " common reflection on the new
European security conditions " WEU describes
NATO's enlargement as a " part of an evolutio-
nary process that takes into account political and
security developments in the whole of Europe and
maintains an undivided continent. It will threaten
no one and be part of the broad European security
architecture based on true co-operation through-
out Europe. It will strengthen the European pillar
of the alliance, and complement the enlargement
of the European Union, a parallel process which
also, for its part, contributes significantly to
extending security and stability ".
62. It is precisely this " parallel process " that
now seems to be totally dominated by NATO
which, on 20th September 1995, approved at
ambassadorial level a first version of a study on a
definition of requirements for its enlargement,
presented to all25 peplgrs of the. partneqs$q for
peace prograrrune, including Russia, on 28th Sep-
tember. The study examines frst and foremost the
question " why and how " to enlarge but does not
answer the questions of " who and when ". The
foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Council
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will take initial decisions on the study at their next
meeting in December. In order to soften opposi-
tion from Moscow to any NATO expansion,
NATO at the same time offered possible changes
to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe
(CFE). Meanwhile it appears that the reaty can
enter into force as foreseen on 17th Novem-
ber 1995 after a compromise has been found by
excluding some distritts from the flank areas, as
defined by the treaty, thus allowing the Russians
to keep a higher level of military equipment in the
remaining districts, including the Caucasus area ".
63. However, the Russian foreign minister,
Mr. Kozyrev, has already made clear that no link
can be established between NATO expansion and
western concessions on changes to the CFE Trea-
ty. The explanations given to Russia on the basis
of the study on NATO enlargement have appa-
rently not convinced the Russian Government to
change its hostile attitude towards enlargement.
The summitmeeting between thepresidents of the
United States and of Russia on the occasion of the
celebration of the 50th anniversary of the United
Nations in New York in no way modified Russia's
opposition. According to press reports '' the Rus-
sian defence ministry is even believed to have
drawn up a contingency plan to create a defence
alliance against NATO and to redeploy its forces,
including nuclear weapons, along its western bor-
der in the event of NAIO's eastward expansion.
According to these reports, the Russian general
staff is said to have recommended, inter alia, the
redeployment of tactical nuclear missiles in Bela-
rus, in Kaliningrad and on warships of the Rus-
sian Baltic Fleet. Furthernore it is reported to
have recommended that if the Baltic republicsjoin NATO, Russia should instantly move forces
into Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia.
64. As a result of the meeting of NAIO defen-
ce ministers in Williamsburg on 5th and 6th Octo-
ber 1995, it seems that any decision on taking fur-
ther steps in the question of enlargement has been
postponed until after the presidential elections in
Russia and the United States next year and per-
haps even after finishing the intergovernmental
conference early in 1997. Possibly a NATO sum-
mit meeting would be convened in early 1997
when certain countries considered suitable for
starting enlargement negotiations would be invi-
ted'3. For the time being, it should be noted that
according to the study, the protection provided by
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, including its
nuclear component, will apply to possible new
members. But there is no a priori requirement for
the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory
of new members. No need is actually seen to
I l. [nternational Herald Tribune, 2lst-22nd October I 995.
12. The Times, 30th September 1995.
13. Reuters World Report, 5th October 1995 and Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeiurg, 10th October 1995.
change NATO's nuclear posture or policy. Regar-
ding conventional forces the study says that " for
new members, the peacetime stationing of other
allies' forces on their territory should neither be a
condition of membership nor foreclosed as an
option ".
65. It goes without saying that it is of primary
interest for all WEU member countries and in par-
ticular for WEU's associate partners, to examine
how the debate on NATO enlargement will affect
WEU's and the European Union's future policy
towards Central European countries. As your
Rapporteur learned from a member of the Perma-
nent Council of WEU, it seems unlikely that
WEU will make major efforts at the present time
to develop further the status of associate partner-
ship for the nine Central European countries.
There will probably be a pause for a while and the
impression is that for the time being the associate
partner countries accept their status in WEU.
Nevertheless one associate partner told the Politi-
cal Committee that the German foreign minister
had said recently that Germany might insist on
accelerating the movement for the associate part-
ners to become full members of WEU. There are
also press reports that the way should be opened
for associate partners to join WEU, but without
any automatic promise of military help against
aggression'0.
66. According to these reports, the German
Chancellor told his fellow leaders in the European
Union that this may be the best way of reconciling
the demands of the Central European countries for
greater security without risking confrontation with
Moscow. According to the same source, Article V
of the modified Brussels Treaty would be " tempo-
rarily frozen ". A form of " soft security " would
be actually discussed for the interested countries.
A European diplomat is believed to have said.
" We will not debate the NATO security guarantee
but the existing WEU security guarantee is any-
way due to be reviewed in 1998 ". In order to bring
certain Central European countries more quickly
into practical membership of the European Union,
they would eventually join WEU without securiry
guarantees well before a new treaty on the Euro'
pean Union could be ratified.
67. The abovementioned considerations 
- 
if
confirmed 
- 
show the importance of closer exa-
mination of the relationship between the respec-
tive security guarantees of the modified Brussels
Treaty and the Washington Treaty and their com-
plementary functions as your Rapporteur reques-
ted in paragraphs 46-51 of this report. It is diffi-
cult to see how Article V could be " temporarily
frozen " without a treaty amendment which would
require parliamentary ratification. Furthermore, if
associate partner countries become full members,
I4
14. The Guardian, 9th October 1995.
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this would mean inviting them to accede to the
modified Brussels Treaty " on conditions to be
agreed ".
68. Should it be agreed in a protocol of acces-
sion that Article V would not be applicable in
relation to Central European countries, one might
wonder what broader consequences such a dilu-
tion of WEU's security guarantee might have, for
instance, with respect to Austria, Denmark, Fin-
land, Ireland and Sweden which so far have refu-
sed to participate in common defence in the fra-
mework of WEU, and also in a wider context
regarding WEU's character as a defence alliance.
Furthermore, the significance of the term " soft
security guarantee " has to be clarified and defi-
ned. If the main purpose is to lose no time in
giving Central European countries an enhanced
status in WEU without being obliged to conclude
a formal treaty introducing a lengthy ratification
process, one could offer them an associate mem-
ber status as is already the case for Iceland, Nor-
way and Turkey.
69. But the final objective should remain for
associate partner countries to accede sooner or
later to all provisions of the modified Brussels
Treaty in parallel with their accession to the Euro-
pean Union 
- 
an intention which has never raised
objections from Russia. One may therefore won-
der whether the authorities of the European Union
should be allowed to make use of possible pro-
blems of NATO enlargement in relation to speci-
fic Central European countries, the Baltic states
for instance, to impose conditions for these coun-
nies in security matters which could make nego-
tiations over their entry into the European Union
very difficult. If press reports E are correct in sta-
ting that the European Union has indicated that if
the Baltic countries join, it will be on condition
that they do not become full members of WEU on
account of the implications this could have for
relations with Russia, this would be a very serious
matter which should immediately give rise to
consultation in WEU. Given that it has been said
countless times that Russia has no veto over
NATO enlargement, no more should it veto the
enlargement of WEU. Another problem is that the
United States has several times expressed its
opposition to the admission of countries to full
membership of WEU without their being NATO
members. Bearing in mind the close ties between
NATO and WEU, the Americans do not want
these countries, in acceding to WEU, to obtain a
NATO security guarantee by the " back door ".
70. So far, WEU's Maastricht declaration of
10th December I99l proposes that " States which
are members of the European Union are invited to
accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in
accordance with Article XI of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty, or to become observers if they so
wish ". NATO membership for these countries is
not expressly mentioned. However, the position
of some WEU member countries is that it could
become one of the " conditions to be agreed ". In
the facrfinding discussions your Rapporteur held
with representatives of the WEU Council a United
States veto against WEU enlargement was not
considered theoretically impossible. On the other
hand, NATO representatives in Brussels told him
it would be crucial for all member countries of the
European Union to become full members of Wes-
tern European Union, if not immediately, at least
as an outcome of the 1996 intergovernmental
conference.
71. In this connection it should be recalled that
Mr. Rathbone, during the joint meeting with the
Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council in Lisbon
on 16th May 1995, asked what the Council
thought about possible NATO enlargement and
the prospects for WEU if such enlargement did
not occur. The reply was that an initial exchange
of views had revealed disagreement between
ministers, in particular, on the relative importance
of WEU's ties with NATO and the European
Union. It was agreed that the aim was to achieve a
balanced position on membership of the three
organisations but that it was very difficult to bring
this about. WEU's Secretary-General had obser-
ved on that occasion that the implementation of
Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty requi-
red that the countries concerned should be linked
to NATO.
72. A further problem lies in the fact that in
none of the three organisations in question(NATO, the European Union and WEU) does
there seem to be agreement between all member
countries on the desirability, necessity and degree
of urgency of enlargement nor on the group of
countries to be admitted. If the collective defence
obligation under Article V of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty and its close link with the collective
defence capability of NAIO is considered as the
cornerstone of Western European Union, its enlar-
gement will be almost totally dependent on the
outcome of NATO enlargement. Such interdepen-
dence could also have important consequences on
the progress of enlargement of the European
Union. However, in an article published in the
NATO Review in September 1995, Mr. Barroso,
then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal,
stressed, inter alia, that:
" If we want to avoid the logic of inter-
locking institutions degenerating into a pro-
cess of " interblocking institutions ", we
must be prepared to accept that the Euro-
pean side of the transatlantic partnership
will have, during a transition period, seve-
ral formats. This could raise some difficul-
ties within the transatlantic partnership,15. Financial Times, 22nd September 1995.
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namely with regard to the compatibility of
the collective security articles (Articles 5
and V) of NATO's Washington Treaty and
the WEU's modified Brussels Treaty. Some
of these problems may be unavoidable. "
73. It seems perfectly justified to follow these
considerations which would allow the conditions
of WEU enlargement to be reexamined on their
own merits, although in close co-ordination with
the Atlantic Alliance (and the European Union).
In this way, one could envisage the full accession
of Central European countries to the modified
Brussels Treaty in anticipation of their accession
to NAIO (and the European Union) without sacri-
ficing Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty.
Eventually, one could examine the usefulness of a
provision in a protocol of accession according to
which the acceding country would benefit from
the modified Brussels Treaty security guarantee
only from the moment its accession to the
Washington Treaty comes into force.
74. Although the study on the enlargement of
NATO carefully avoids mentioning the question in
the chapter in which it explains why NATO is to be
enlarged, relations with Russia are the decisive
element which will determine the way in which
the whole enlargement process is to be pursued.
Regardless of the repeated affrmation that Russia
has no right of veto in this respect, there is a gro-
wing opinion that the enlargement process of
NAIO needs to be pursued in consultation with
Russia. Because of the interdependence of the
NATO, WEU and European Union enlargement
described above, co-ordination between WEU and
NATO in their relations with Russia is imperative.
75. With Russia's acceptance of its individual
partnership prograrnme in the framework of the
PFP (partnership for peace) prograrnme relations
between the Atlantic Alliance and Russia have
attained a new quality representing a considerable
advance over those with other PFP partner coun-
tries. In its communiqu6 of 30th May 1995 the
alliance proposes " that NAIO and Russia initiate
a dialogue, to be pursued in our newly-established
relationship beyond the PFP, on the future direc-
tion our relationship should take. Our aim would
be to achieve by the end of this year a political
framework for NATO-Russia relations elabora-
ting basic principles for security co-operation as
well as for the development of mutual political
consultations ".
76. Furthermore, the communiqu6 affirms:
" The construction of a co-operative European
security architecture requires the active participa-
tion of Russia. In this context, it is our desire to
have Russia play its proper important r6le. We are
committed to a close relationship with Russia,
based on mutual respect and openness. This rela-
tionship can only flourish if it is rooted in strict
compliance with international commitments and
obligations ". On 3lst May 1995, a special docu-
ment on dialogue and co-operation between
NATO and Russia was adopted by the North
Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC).
77. Nevertheless, the Atlantic Alliance has so
far never clearly defined the whys and wherefores
of the need to develop its relations with Russia. In
particular the alliance has never explicitly exclu-
ded Russia from the enlargement process. Onllth January 1994, the heads of state and of
government of the North Atlantic Council decla-
red that " we expect and would welcome NATO
expansion that would reach to democratic states to
our East ". The study on NATO enlargement
emphasises " not to foreclose the possibility of
eventual alliance membership for any European
state in accordance with Article 10 of the
Washington Treaty ". Is Russia to be considered
as a " European state "? The answer to this kind of
question is certainly easier in the cases of Belarus,
Moldova and Ukraine.
78. [t is noteworthy that the study on NATO
enlargement contains no reference to remaining
security risks which could underpin the reason
for enlarging an alliance whose fundamental
purpose is " to preserve peace in the Euro-Atlan-
tic area and to provide security for its mem-
bers ". Russia is mainly mentioned as a partner
with which dialogue and co-operation are to be
developed. Conversely, the WEU common
reflection on the new European security condi-
tions identifies security risks with regard to Rus-
sia, mentioning in particular that the Chechen
crisis " illustrates the dangers of internal instabi-
lity and the possible threat to regional security ",
with special reference to " the sheer size of
Russia's conventional forces and its extensive
nuclear arsenal ".
79. It will be importanr ro put an end to the
ambiguities of considering Russia as either a secu-
rity risk or co-operation partner or even a counfiry
with a chance of being integrated into western
security structures. Various proposals suggesting
the estabtshment of a " strategic partnership " with
Russia have not yet been seriously examined in
detail. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that according
to press reports'6 NAIO has made proposals for a
special relationship with Russia. According to
these sources, a draft ofproposals 
- 
already presen-
ted to Russia's representative in Brussels 
- 
contains
an offer to Moscow of a new treaty or some form of
standing committee, such as exists for monitoring
arms confrol freaties, to review all areas of concern.
A political framework for relations with Russia
would cover all basic principles for security co-
operation as well as for the development of mutual
political consultations. Such an initiative is of
course of major interest to WEU.
r6
16. International Herald Tribune, 27th September 1995.
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80. The Assembly of WEU has always atta-
ched great importance to the development of a
more structured and specific relationship bet-
ween WEU and Russia and has transmitted a
number of concrete recommendations to the
Council on the basis of the report submitted by
Mr. Baumel'7 on 10th November 1994. Howevet
the Lisbon declaration of 15th May 1995 devotes
only a few sentences to the subject; in this, WEU
Ministers reiterate " the particular importance of
the relationship with Russia and Ukraine ". How-
ever, the precaution of " not duplicating dialogue
in other fora " reduces the aim of contact largely
to " exchanges of information on issues of com-
mon interest ". Here again one has to ask why the
WEU Council underestimates the importance of
its own dialogue with Russia in this way. WEU
has enough specific features of its own to remind
the Council that a more substantial and structured
dialogue with Russia could constitute an impor-
tant contribution to expanding confidence and
easing the entire enlargement problem. It is there-
fore regrettable that the chapter on Russia in
WEU's " Common reflection on the new Euro-
pean security conditions " only mentions Rus-
sia's importance as a partner of the European
Union.
81. Another open question is the matter of co-
ordination between WEU and NAIO in their rela-
tions with Mediterranean countries. According to
the " common reflection " referred to above " the
Mediterranean Basin is a high priority for Euro-
pean security. This area merits particular attention
from WEU, which has initiated a dialogue on
security issues with certain North African coun-
tries (Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, Tuni-
sia) ". It then goes on to say that " NATO is also in
the course of developing its dialogue with coun-
tries in the area (Egypt, Israel, Mauritania,
Morocco, Tunisia). Consequently countries such
as Algeria are included in the WEU dialogue,
whose development is indeed worthy of attention,
whereas the NATO dialogue includes Israel.
However, your Rapporteur was told that NATO
now plans to extend its dialogue to Algeria.
Conversely the WEU Secretary-General announ-
ced in a recent article in the NATO Review that
WEU's Mediterranean dialogue also encom-
passes Israel. Is this an indication that there is a
procedure for harmonising the WEU and NATO
dialogues with Mediterranean countries? The
same question might be raised in relation to other
areas in the world such as Africa, Asia and the
Pacific, and also Latin America, all of which
regions are mentioned as areas of security interest
to Europe in the " Common reflection on the new
European security conditions " agreed by the
WEU Council in Lisbon.
V. The importance of the future evolution
of Euro-American relatinns and the impact
of the 1 99 6 intergov ernrne ntal c onferenc e
82. Since the end of the East-West confronta-
tion and the break-up of the Soviet Union, many
voices have expressed concern that the transatlan-
tic ties might became looser and that the foreign
and security interests of North America and Euro-
pe were beginning to drift apart. The fact that the
WEIJ " Common reflection on the new European
security conditions " devotes an important para-
graph to transatlantic relationships with particular
reference to the United States and Canada is
therefore to be welcomed. In this context, special
attention should be paid to the following two
statements: " Europe, ihe United States and eana-
da share a common heritage and are bound by
close historical, political, economic and cultural
ties " and, some paragraphs later: " Both the Uni-
ted States and Canada support Europe's efforts
towards further integration ". There is, moreover,
a reference to the declaration on EC-US relations
agreed in November 1990 which underlines the
determination of both sides to strengthen transat-
lantic relationships in a broad area that extends
beyond security and defence.
83. However, closer consideration of specific
attitudes on both sides raises a concern as to
whether all these statements are not mere wishful
thinking. Official statements from both sides of
the Atlantic seem to reveal somewhat different
approaches on how to shape future Euro-Ame-
rican relations. Whereas the United States and
Canada initiated the project of a transatlantic free
trade area, European countries are still divided
over the idea. On the other hand, its seems that
European ideas for drawing up a new transatlantic
treaty or charter have not found a very enthusias-
tic echo on the American side. However this may
be, European politicians continue to make new
proposals and plans in this respect, particularly in
view of the European-American summit meeting
which is to be held in Madrid on 3rd Decem-
ber 1995 between the United States Presi-
dent Bill Clinton, the Spanish Prime Minister
Felipe Gonzalez as current president of the Euro-
pean Union and the president of the European
Commission. In preparation for this meeting, the
European Union has presented the Americans
with a working document, details of which are not
known. It is thought to cover basic areas for co-
operation, including international peace, security
and stability, international challenges and closer
economic relationsrs.
84. If security matters are included in this
document, one might well wonder if and to what
extent WEU and NATO have been involved in the
T7
17. Document 1440. 18. International Herald Tribune, 3rd October 1995.
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preparatory work. It was Malcolm Rifkind,
Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, who, in
a speech at Chatham House on 21st Septem-
ber 1995re, advocated the creation of a new Atlan-
tic community of Europe and North America,
based on a three part progamme. The frst part
would be to revitalise transatlantic economic rela-
tions (with free trade), second to co-operate on
European security and third " to develop a much
closer dialogue between Congress and the parlia-
ments of Western Europe. Political debate is at the
heart of our democratic systems on both sides of
the Atlantic, yet contracts between parliamenta-
rians are much less frequent and deep than they
should be. Wide-ranging political dialogue is the
necessary base for common action. "
85. A similar initiative was launched by the
German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, advoca-
ting the establishment of a fiansatlantic agenda
with an even broader spectrum of Euro-American
co-operation and in a speech in the Council of
Europe Chancellor Kohl offered the United States
and Canada permanent accommodation in the
European House'0. It is not yet easy to identify the
interest of Americans in these various initiatives
apart from repeated affirmation by American poli-
ticians that the United States will remain a politi-
cal power. But in a speech in Bonn at the end of
June 1995, a high senior official of the United
States Embassy believed that if treaty negotia-
tions were to be started, it would certainly have to
be after the successful conclusion of the interna-
tional conference to revise the Maastricht Treaty
to be held next year. It was important to know
what impact a transatlantic heaty would have on
the process of European integration and on a com-
mon foreign and security policy pursued by the
European Union. He added that the United States
believed that greater transatlantic co-operation
was in the interest of both the European Union
and the United States. This is a very important
aspect, and one could also turn the question by
asking what will be the consequences of a com-
mon foreign and security policy for transatlantic
relations.
86. The importance of an enhanced Euro-Ame-
rican parliamentary dialogue should be particular-
ly emphasised in this context. So far, it has been
practically impossible to interest the American
Congress in a regular dialogue with European
politicians 
- 
an experience recently confirmed
during the Washington Conference organised by
the WEU Council in the framework of its transat-
lantic publicity activities, or at the recent Council
of Europe debate on the OECD. However, your
Rapporteur was very encouraged by a meeting he
had with nine representatives of the United States
Senate and House of Representatives during the
19. The Times, 2lst September 1995.
20. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitlng,4th October 1995.
recent session of the North Atlantic Assembly in
Turin on 7th October 1995. First, the Americans
attending that meeting gave assurances that the
Congress had not lost interest in European matters
and that the European ancestry of many United
States citizens continued to ensure close transat-
lantic links. They thus confirmed a similar view
expressed in WEU's common reflection on the
new European security conditions.
87. Furthermore, they were prepared to facili-
tate future meetings with WEU Assembly com-
mittees when the latter next visited the United
States. It will be important to make full use of this
very successful exchange of views in order to
establish closer contacts with the United States
Congress it 1996. Enhanced dialogue is crucial
both for stimulating the interest and knowledge of
members of Congress in European affairs and for
improving our own understanding of American
thinking and motives behind their political action.
88. For instance, hitherto Europeans often had
the impression that if Congress takes particular
initiatives with respect to Europe, regarding
NATO enlargement for instance, or in favour of
lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzego-
vina, it is often due rather to the influence of the
more influential ethnic lobbies or other United
States pressure $oups rather than an expression
of coherent political thinking. As to the United
States Administration and the White House, the
political actions of both are largely dictated by
internal policy considerations. The direction of
American foreign policy towards European
affairs has changed several times recently. After a
long period of hesitation, the United States is now
exerting much stronger pressure for the condi-
tions of NATO's enlargement to be finalised. Fol-
lowing years of political and military abstention
from the conflict in the Balkans, which it conside-
red a European matter, the United States has now
taken the lead in political and military crisis-
management in order to bring about a peaceful
end to the conflict.
89. It is precisely this example of the war in the
Balkans that raises serious doubts about the abili-
ty of the member countries of Western European
Union and of the European Union to achieve ajoint foreign, security and defence policy and to
create what is described as a common European
security and defence identity without the leader-
ship of the United States of America. It is a fact
that there has been progress in former Yugoslavia
only since the United States decided to take a
lead, although we will never know what would
have happened if the Vance-Owen plan had recei-
ved the support it deserved from all concerned. A
similar evolution is to be observed in the context
of the development of the West's relations with
the Central and Eastern European countries
where, as a result of a new initiative on the part of
18
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the United States, the problem of NAIO's expan-
sion now seems to dominate all other considera-
tions raised in this area by the European organisa-
tions concerned.
90. In this context, a strong impression is gained
that too little attention is being paid in the frame-
work of the preparation of the 1996 intergovern-
mental conference to the inter-related aims of crea-
ting a European security and defence identity
(ESDD and developing new European-transatlantic
relations with particular reference to the United
States. The interim report of the European reflec-
tion group devotes only one short and ihsubstantial
paragraph to this topic. If there is agreement that
the development of the ESDI should be achieved in
such a way as to lead to a closer relationship bet-
ween Europe and the North American allies, the
arrangements still have to be worked out.
91. AIl who are convinced that a merger bet-
ween WEU and the European Union and conse-
quently a replacement of WEU relations with
NATO by direct relations between the European
Union and the Atlantic Alliance as an eventual
outcome of the intergovernmental conference
would not substantially affect transatlantic rela-
tions, are out of touch with reality. Apart from the
open question of the place which would be offe-
red to Norway, Iceland and Turkey in such a new
construction, a comprehensive negotiation of
transatlantic relations would be inevitable. How-
ever, neither on the European nor the American
side are clear concepts regarding the essentials of
a new transatlantic treaty visible. The need to seek
an appropriate political personality able to replace
Mr. Claes as NATO's Secretary-General has revi-
ved public discussion about the alliance's future
direction. Some believe that NAIO's problem is
that " there is no Big Idea any more o"'.
92. Without a truly new vision it would be
pointless and even dangerous to ask for a new
transatlantic treaty. What should be settled in that
treaty? It will be more important to use existing
instruments and frameworks in order to reach
agreement on common challenges, interests and
objectives on both sides of the Atlantic. In this
context, it is most important for Europe for nei-
ther neo-isolationist nor unilateralist tendencies to
succeed in dominating future political thinking
and action in the United States. It is for Europe to
prove that North America needs the European
partnership in order to handle future common
challenges. Concerns that North America could in
future see more advantages in an American-Paci-
fic community can be dispelled only by a Europe
demonstrating that it is still the most reliable part-
ner of the United States as it was in all recent
conflicts. A strong Europe can encourage the Uni-
ted States to compromise but even a sfong Euro-
pe will still need the American partnership. Any
efforts by Europeans to become more independent
from the United States, particularly in military
technology, should be aimed at achieving a better-
balanced partnership, not following a unilateral
policy.
93. An important item on the future transatlan-
tic agenda should be the definition of areas where
Europeans and North Americans share the same
interests and objectives and where they conse-
quently should act in common or where they wish
to proceed with a reciprocal distribution of tasks.
The slogan of identifying the respective " risks,
r6les and responsibilities " should be transformed
into a concrete political prograrnme to be elabora-
ted flrst and foremost between Western European
Union and the Atlantic Alliance, but also in the
framework of other Euro-American consultation
mechanisms.
94. The working group on WEU transatlantic
publicity activities should play an enhanced rOle
and perhaps be transformed into a true political
forum as the Assembly had proposed in Recom-
mendation 579. Furthermore, this group should be
enlarged from the at present thirteen WEU mem-
ber and associate member states to include
observer and associate partner countries. The
Assembly should be fully associated with its acti-
vities. Furthermore, the Assembly should receive
a comprehensive report on the origins: status,
working methods, rotation of presidency and
future programme of work of this group.
95. According to Henry Kissingerz, the ffans-
atlantic partnership within the Atlantic Alliance
whose principal goal was initially joint resistance
to communism, should now be extended to a glo-
bal level. If one is inclined to follow such a vision,
Euro-American co-operation would become more
than a " transatlantic bargain " in which North
Americans continue to help Europe in the case
of conflicts in Europe and Europe shows active
solidarity in areas in which, frst and foremost,
American interests are at stake. An Atlantic com-
munity would mean, beyond that, a common and
co-ordinated Euro-American political approach
throughout the world on the basis of common
values and interests. On that ground Europeans
and Americans should come together in order
to elaborate common answers to common
challenges.
96. The " Common reflection on the new Euro-
pean security conditions " presented in Lisbon
contains the following statement:
" Bearing in mind the radically altered
security environment, the further deve-
22. Die Atlantische Gemeinschaft neu begriinden in Intema-
tionale Politik, No. 1, January 1995.
21. George Brock: Alliance in search of big idea, The Times,
2l st-22nd October I 995.
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lopment of European co-operation in the
field of security and defence and the broa-
der definition of what constitutes a security
challenge, proposals have been made for a
further strengthening of transatlantic ties
and a broader framework to express the
solidarity and commonality of values and
interests that constitute the link between
the European and North American part-
ners.'o
It will be necessary to learn more of the substance
of these proposals. Work now being done in the
WEU Council to prepare the WEU contribution to
the work of the intergovernmental conference and
to draw up a final document on the new European
security conditions which might lead to a white
paper on European security should pay closer
attention to placing future transatlantic relations
in a global context than has been done hitherto.
Also, a concrete ftansatlantic programme of work
should be prepared in which all areas are identi-
fied in which Europe, in the framework of Wes-
tern European Union, would be prepared to assu-
me particular responsibilities. For this purpose, it
will be necessary to include a chapter in the final
documents detailing the cost of security and
addressing the budgetary consequences of new
security risks.
VI. Conclusi.ons
97. On reviewing the results achieved to date in
implementing WEU's objectives in relation to the
development of its relations with the Atlantic
Alliance, it has to be admitted that none of the
major aims has as yet been achieved. In a number
of areas there is even serious doubt as to whether
they will be.
98. Agreement over the concept of combinedjoint task forces (CffF) has become a major poli-
tical issue, the resolution of which will, according
to some observers, provide a kind of " life-line "
for WEU's future. All WEU's efforts to become
operational, particularly in order to be able to
carry out " Petersberg " missions, appear to be
blocked by the failure to resolve the CJTF pro-
blem. There are no criteria for a division of labour
between WEU and NATO in the area of crisis-
management. As the conflict in former Yugosla-
via demonstrates, WEU continues to be margina-
lised from an area on which it has concentrated its
greatest effort since Petersberg, namely peace-
keeping and crisis-management. It seems that
NATO has now also taken the lead in defining
methods for monitoring possible peace settle-
ments in former Yugoslavia. Consequently, the
usefulness of WEU is increasingly being called
into question.
99. Furthermore, the obvious difficulties of
introducing joint positions, agreed in WEU, into
the process of consultation in the alliance raises a
question-mark both over the political willingness
and the ability of its member countries to draw the
practical consequences of the aim of achieving a
European security and defence identity and Ame-
rican readiness to accept such a European identiry
in the Atlantic Alliance. In this situation it is vir-
tually impossible to discern 
- 
agreement on minor
technical questions apart 
- 
any political substance
or direction in WEU's present relations with the
Atlantic Alliance. Consequently the question
must be raised as to the purpose served by closer
working links between the two organisations.
WEU has to date been unable to contribute to
strengthening the alliance while the alliance, on
the other hand, has so far shown no positive signs
of adapting its organisation and resources or of
developing its political and military structures and
procedures to facilitate co-operation with WEU
following the decisions taken at the NATO sum-
mit meeting in January 1994.
100. In view of the preparation of the 1996 inter-
governmental conference, the possible conse-
quences for transatlantic co-operation and should
there be any substantial modifications in WEU's
r01e as defence component of the European Union
will have to be examined in far greater depth
when the WEU Council makes its own review of
the present provisions of the Maastricht Treaty in
1996. Such a contribution should, furthermore,
include a comprehensive European concept regar-
ding what is fundamental in a new ffansatlantic
partnership on a global scale. As a matter of
urgency, WEU will have to make without delay an
assessment of the consequences of the study on
NATO enlargement for its own future policy vis-
i-vis Central and Eastern countries as well as the
Russian Federation.
101. Euro-American relations are at present in a
period of transition with the risk that the feeling of
common values and interests is diminishing on
both sides of the Atlantic. Europe has therefore
particular responsibility for proving that it is still
the most reliable partner of the United States as
has been proved in the past. In security and defen-
ce matters Europe can demonstrate its reliability
only through a strong WEU.
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APPENDIX
RE,COMMENDATION 579
on new trends in North American coantries'foreign policy
and their ilnplicatians for transatlantic co-operatian in security and defence
matters, with panicuhr reference to the United States
The Assembly,
(i) Recalling that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact left the Uni-
ted States the primary superpower in the world;
(ii) Considering that the Democratic President of the United States, President Clinton, has proclaimed
his first priority in his political objectives, to be the settling of America's urgent internal problems in the
field of necessary reforms in the social health, educational and budgetary system as well as in the fight
against criminality and terrorism;
(iii) Recalling also that the new United States priorities in foreign and security policy are concentrated
on the creation of a new kind of Asian Pacific community, containing nuclear proliferation in counEies
such as North Korea, China and Russia and reducing the American anti-missile defence programme fol-
lowing a sfiict interpretation of the ABM Treaty;
(iv) Observing however that the freedom of action of the United States President has been considerably
curtailed by the sweeping victory of the Republican Party in the congressional elections on 8th Novem-
ber 1994 which appeared to weaken the policy of a bipartisan approach;
(v) Noting that the new Congress, which is still working out its policy direction, has started trying to
impose restrictions on the American executive regarding, in particular, its foreign, security and defence
policy, by drafting new legislation such as the " Peace Power Act " and the " National Security Revitali-
sation Act o';
(vi) Noting with satisfaction that United States foreign policy has been successful in finalising the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the support of the Canadian Parliament, revitalising
Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) and co-operating in the ASEAN Regional Security Forum,
thus contributing to enhancing economic stability and securiry in the regions concerned;
(vii) Noting uneasily, however, that the various signals emanating from the United States Government
and Congress and the steps they are taking regarding relations with Europe, the future of the Atlantic
Alliance and its enlargement to Cenffal and Eastern European countries, relations with Russia and the r6le
of the United Nations are not always consistent, nor does the United States consult on these questions suf-
ficiently with its European allies and partners;
(viii) Woried about the serious differences between the United States and most of its European allies
over the ways of settling the conflict in former Yugoslavia;
(ix) Further angered that the decisions reached at the NATO summit meeting in January 1994 to make
collective assets of the alliance available for WEU operations are still not being carried into effect,
because of remaining Euro-American differences over the procedure to follow;
(x) Having a strong impression that the question of whether and how Euro-American relations should
be renewed and founded on a new and enlarged contractual basis are being discussed far more by Euro-
pean than by American politicians;
(xi) Deploring the incredible difficulties in establishing a regular parliamentary dialogue between the
Assembly of Western European Union and the Congress of the United States;
(xii) Reiterating the importance of making full use of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty for esta-
blishing closer links with the United States Government through WEU's co-operation with NAIO,
Rpcoruwxos rHAr rm CouNcu-
1. Translate into active policy its intention voiced in its Noordwijk declaration " to continue to work
together in close association with the North American allies. The security of the alliance and of Europe as
a whole is indivisible. The transatlantic partnership rests on a shared foundation of values and interests.
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Just as the commitment of the North American democracies is vital to Europe's security, a free, indepen-
dent and increasingly more united Europe will contribute to the security of North America ";
2. Devote a special chapter to the future r6le of the United States in regard to European security
and the question of reforming fransatlantic relations in the white paper now being prepared on European
security;
3. Transform the working group on Transatlantic Publicity Activities into a true political forum with
which ministers of WEU member countries can establish an enhanced dialogue with United States politi-
cians in order to strengthen their interest in and knowledge of WEU's work in the European and transat-
lantic framework and ensure that members of the Assembly can participate in this dialogue or in a new
North American/European Parliamentary Assembly based on the WEU and North Atlantic Assemblies.
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